Abstract-It is well-known that a market equilibrium with uniform prices often does not exist in non-convex day-ahead electricity auctions. We consider the case of the new PanEuropean day-ahead electricity market PCR (Price Coupling of Regions), with non-convexities arising from so-called complex and block orders. We propose a new primal-dual framework for these auctions, which has applications for both economic analysis and algorithm design. The contribution is threefold. First, extending previous results, we give a non-trivial exact (i.e. not approximate) linearisation of a non-convex minimum income condition that must hold for complex orders arising from the Spanish market, avoiding the introduction of any auxiliary variables. Second, we give the first and tractable MILP formulations of optimization problems such as the maximization of the traded volume, or the minimization of opportunity costs of paradoxically rejected orders. Third, numerical experiments are presented which show the tradeoffs that may occur in practice, as well as the efficiency of the approach.
i
Index for hourly bids, in set I j Index for block (binary) bids, in set J c Index for MIC bids, in set C hc Index for hourly bids associated to MIC bid c running from 1 to |H c | l index for locations, l(i) denotes location of bid i, etc t index for time slots, t(i) denotes location of bid i, etc I lt Set of hourly bids associated to location l and time t HC lt Set of MIC hourly bids, associated to location l and time slot t J l subset of block bids associated to location l Parameters:
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Manuscript revised 16th October 2014 P i , P hc Power (maximum) amount of hourly bid i or hc P < 0 for sell bids, and P > 0 for demand bids λ i , λ hc Limit bid price of hourly bid i or hc Variables:
x i fraction of power P i which is executed y j binary variable which determines if the quantities P t j is fully accepted or rejected x hc fraction of power P hc which is executed u c binary variable controling the execution or rejection of mic order c n k variables to describe the network, related to net export positions
I. INTRODUCTION
The general context is recalled in A, PCR market rules in B, and a description of the present contribution is given in C.
A. Equilibrium in non-convex day-ahead electricity auctions
A N extensive literature now exists on non-convex dayahead electricity markets or electricity pools, dealing with market equilibrium issues in the presence of indivisibilities, see e.g. [1] , [3] , [4] , [5] , [6] and references therein. Almost all ideas revolve around reaching back, or getting close to a convex situation where strong duality holds and shadow prices exist. For example, a now classic proposition [5] is to fix integer variables to optimal values for a welfare maximizing primal program whose constraints describe physically feasible dispatches of electricity, and compute multi-part equilibrium prices using dual variables of these fixing constraints. A recent proposition for electricity pools [1] is to use a 'primaldual' formulation where 'getting close' is materialized by minimising the duality gap introduced by integer constraints, and where additional constraints are added to ensure that producers are recovering their costs. Several other auction designs have been previously proposed, see e.g. [1] for a review.
B. The PCR market
We consider here the newly launched Pan-european dayhead electricity market developed under the Price Coupling of Regions project (PCR), as publicly described in [7] . Generally speaking, it is a near-equilibrium auction mechanism using uniform prices, and where the only deviations from a perfect market equilibrium is the allowance of so-called "paradoxically rejected non-convex bids" to which opportunity costs are hence incurred. On the other side, all continuous bids as well as TSOs must be 'at equilibrium' for the computed market clearing prices. This integrated market is coupling the CWE region (France, Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands, Luxembourg) with NordPool (Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Finland, Baltic countries), as well as Italy and OMEL (Spain, Portugal).
From the algorithmic point of view, when considering specifically the CWE region, we have previously shown that the market clearing problem can be restated as a MILP, without introducing any auxiliary variables to linearise the needed complementarity conditions [8] . Leaving aside a very peculiar kind of bids from the Italian market (so-called PUN bids), introducing complex bids with a MIC condition provides a non-convex MINLP. The production-quality algorithm in use, EUPHEMIA [7] , an extension of COSMOS previously used to clear the CWE market, is a sophisticated branch-and-cut algorithm handling all market requirements. However, due to the introduction of MIC bids, the algorithm is a heuristic, though COSMOS on which it relies is an exact branch-andcut.
C. Contribution of the paper
We provide here a new primal-dual framework for PCR-like auctions, which is mainly a continuation of ideas presented in [8] , [9] . The primary goal is to present a unified approach to algorithmic and economic modelling issues concerning these European auctions, with practical applications.
First, extending results presented in [8] , we give an exact (i.e. not approximate) linearisation of a non-linear non-convex 'minimum income condition' (MIC) concerning so-called MIC orders [7] , which model revenue adequacy for producers. This kind of condition for so-called complex orders is provided for many years by the Spanish power exchange OMEL [10] , and is also considered (in a different setting) in [1] , [2] . Extending [8] , this enables us to give a MILP formulation of the corresponding market clearing problem which avoids complementarity constraints and the use of any auxiliary variables, while taking into account these MIC conditions. Second, we show how to include in a single mathematical program, together with main decision variables such as prices and bid execution levels, variables which correspond to upper bounds on opportunity costs of paradoxically rejected orders. Indeed, it is in the same way possible to consider additional continuous variables corresponding to upper bounds on the actual loss for a paradoxically accepted order. Therefore, current European market rules forbidding paradoxically accepted bids can be easily modelled by requiring that these upper bounds on actual losses must be null. Using this, we provide the first (tractable) MILP formulations for optimization problems such as the maximization of the traded volume, or the minimization of incurred opportunity costs.
II. A NEW PRIMAL-DUAL FRAMEWORK Below, section A positions the problem within the frame of the CWE region, while section B briefly describes complex bids with a minimum income condition introduced in PCR. Then, section C introduces the welfare maximization problem without equilibrium restrictions, while section D derives several important economic interpretations relating dual variables with uniform prices and deviations from a perfect market equilibrium (losses and opportunity costs of executed/rejected non-convex bids). Finally, section E presents the basis of the new primal-dual framework proposed.
A. Uniform prices and price-based decisions: a toy example
We use here a toy example presented in [9] . It illustrates two key points. First, a market equilibrium may not exist in the presence of indivisible orders. Second, under European market rules where paradoxically rejected indivisible bids are allowed, a welfare maximizing solution (W-MAXSOL) is not necessarily a traded volume maximizing solution (TV-MAXSOL) nor it is necessarily an opportunity costs minimizing solution (OC-MINSOL). The toy example consists in a market clearing instance involving two demand hourly (continuous) bids, e.g. two steps of a stepwise demand bid curve, and two sell block bids. Parameters are summarized in Table I First, obviously, it is not possible to execute both sell block bids, as they offer a total amount of power of 30 MW, while the total demand is at most 25 MW. As they are indivisible, if there is a trade, (a) bid C is fully executed or (b) bid D is fully executed. Second, at equilibrium, by definition, for the given market prices, no bidder should prefer another level of execution of its bid. In particular, in-the-money (ITM) bids must be fully executed, out-of-the-money (OTM) must be fully rejected, and fractionally executed bids must be right at-themoney (ATM).
So in the first case (a), A is partially accepted and set the market clearing price to 50 EUR/MW, if an equilibrium with uniform prices would exist. But in that case, block bid D is rejected while ITM: an opportunity cost of 20(50−10) = 800 is incurred. This situation is accepted under the near-equilibrium European market rules, where continuous hourly bids must always be 'at equilibrium', while non-convex bids may be paradoxically rejected. A direct computation shows that the welfare is then equal to 10(50-50) + 10(50-5) = 450, while the traded volume is 10. Similar computations yield the market outcome summarized in Table II .
B. Complex orders with a minimum incomde condition
In the frame of the integration of European electricity markets, products and associated market clearing conditions/rules coming from the national markets have been introduced in the common market model. So-called 'MIC orders' are among these particular products. A MIC order is basically a set of hourly orders with the classical clearing rules but with the additional condition that a given 'minimum income condition' must be satisfied. Otherwise, all hourly orders corresponding to the given MIC order are rejected, even if some of them are ITM. The minimum income condition of the MIC order c ensures that some fixed cost F c together with a variable cost V c × P c are recovered, where P c is the total executed quantity related to the order c, and V c an average variable cost.
Typically, the minimum income condition for an executed MIC order indiced by c has the form:
where H c denotes the set of hourly orders associated with the MIC order c. The left-hand side represents the total income related to order c, given the computed market prices π l,t and executed amount of power h∈Hc −P hc x hc , while the righthand side corresponds to the fixed and (average) variable cost of production. At first sight, this condition is non-linear and non-convex, because of the terms x hc π l(hc),t(hc) in the lefthand side. We show in section III an exact linearisation of this condition avoiding the introduction of any auxiliary variables. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first exact linearisation proposed for this kind of condition.
C. Unrestricted welfare optimization
We formulate here the classical welfare optimization problem with an abstract and very general linear network representation where net export positions are linearly related to some variables n k in (7) corresponding to network resources, and (8) are linear constraints on these resources. It covers e.g. DC network flow models, and usual network equilibrium conditions involving locational market prices apply, see [8] for more details on this issue.
subject to:
D. Duality, uniform prices, losses and opportunity costs
Let us consider now the following constraints, fixing all integer variables to some arbitrarily given values:
Dropping integer constraints (10) not needed any more, this yields an LP whose dual is:
(15) subject to:
We now write down the corresponding complementarity constraints. Economic interpretations are stated below: The following lemma proposes analogous interpretations for the case of MIC orders. Intuitively, neglecting for now the socalled MIC condition, the cost ("shadow cost") of forcing a MIC order to be rejected (given by du r ) is at least equal to the sum of all maximum missed surplus generated by its hourly orders at the given market prices, while there is no cost at forcing it to be accepted: (27) show that s cr = 0, while (17) and (23) give s hcr ≥ max[0, P hcr (λ hcr − π l(hcr),t(hcr) )]. Using these two facts in (20) provides the result.
(ii) As ∀h ∈ H c , s hc ≥ 0, using (21), it follows that ∀c a ∈ C a , s ca − du a ca ≥ 0. Then, we can posedu a ca := 0 and make a simple change of variables ca := s ca − du a ca in (3)-(38) (systems of conditions equivalent in the usual sense).
E. Towards a new framework for PCR-like auctions 1) CWE/PCR auction rules:
The PCR auction rules are mainly legacy of rules used in the CWE region (APX, BELPEX, EPEX) and by NordPool. They are essentially auctions with uniform prices where the only deviations from a perfect market equilibrium is the allowance of "paradoxically rejected non-convex bids", for example the rejection of block orders which are in-the-money and would take advantage of the computed clearing prices [7] . Therefore, we first consider in this subsection a primal-dual framework with uniform prices (UMFS below), allowing us to control deviations from equilibrium for non-convex bids. How to use it specifically for PCR-like auctions is developed in section IV.
2) Price range condition: In theory, admissible market clearing prices may lie outside the price range allowed for bids [11] . This bid price range [−λ bid , λ bid ] is in particular used to avoid market power issues. In practice, power exchanges impose that the computed prices π l,t stay within a given range. This condition is technically needed below, ruling out arbitrarily large market prices, while allowing them to be sufficiently large not exclude any relevant market clearing solution (see [8] ):
3) The new primal-dual framework: This new 'primal-dual approach' makes use of an equality of objective functions (40) to enforce all the economically meaningful complementarity conditions (24)-(38). Leaving aside for the time being the question of MIC bid selections, which are dealt with in next section, the problem is that we don't know a priori what is the best block bid selection J = J r ∪J a [9] . However, the feasible set UMFS described below allows to determine the optimal block bid selection, whatever the desired objective function is, and the pair of optimal points for the corresponding primal and dual programs stated above. This is formalised in Theorem 1 and helps to consider many interesting issues (welfare or traded volume maximization, minimization of opportunity costs, etc), in a computationally efficient way. This is the first step towards the main extension presented in next section, proposing an exact linearisation to deal with MIC bids.
Below, we choose fixed values for the M j large enough in conditions (53), (55) so that conditions (51) are not restraining the range [−π,π] of possible values for π l,t (or the ability to paradoxically reject block bids, proof of Theorem 1). For this purpose, assuming that both the bid and market clearing prices satisfy (39), it is sufficient to set M j := 2π
The analogue for M c in (54) and condition (52).
Also, we make use of Lemma 2 to set, without loss of generality, all the variables d a j := 0 in the following 'primaldual formulation', involving previously stated primal and dual constraints. This is clarified in the proof of Theorem 1.
Uniform Market Clearing Feasible Set (UMFS):
i∈I lt
s hc + P hc π l(hc),t(hc) ≥ P hc λ hc , ∀h ∈ H c , c (x hc ) (50) Proof: See appendix.
III. DEALING WITH COMPLEX MIC BIDS
The following lemma is the key reason for which it is possible to express the a priori non-linear non-convex MIC condition (1) as a linear constraint. The non-linearity comes from the income involving market prices multiplied by executed quantities. However, using strong duality for subproblems where integer variables are fixed (as above), we can provide an exact linearisation of these terms. This enables us to extend results presented in [8] , see thereafter.
Lemma 3. Consider any feasible point of UMFS. Then, the following holds:
Proof: We first define C r and C a as in Theorem 1. For c r ∈ C r , the identity is trivially satisfied, because if a MIC order is rejected, all related hourly orders are rejected: ∀h ∈ H cr , x hcr = 0, and on the other side, s cr = 0 because of complementarity constraint (27).
Let us now consider an accepted MIC bid c a ∈ C a . We first show that the following identity holds:
Consider for x hca the following two possibilities, noting that u ca = 1:
(a) if x hca = 0, the identity ( * ) is trivially satisfied, as s hca = 0 according to complementarity constraints (26).
(b) if 0 < x hca , (34) give s hca = P hca λ hca − P hca π l(hca),t(hca) , so multiplying the equation by x hca and using (26): s hca x hca = s hca u ca = s hca , we get the needed identity.
Summing up ( * ) over h ∈ H ca yields:
Finally, using complementarity constraint (38), we get:
Noting that du a ca := 0 by Lemma 2 in the definition of UMFS, we get the required identity (59).
Using this last Lemma 3, the MIC condition (1) can be stated in a linear way as follows:
where M c is a fixed number large enough to deactivate the constraint when u c = 0.
IV. USING THE FRAMEWORK

A. Clean formulation of the PCR feasible set
We now consider UMFS with the additional MIC conditions (60) for c ∈ C. Let us note that we can make a first simplification of the model by replacing both kinds of conditions (52), (54) by the conditions (73) below. Also, under PCR market rules, as no bid can be paradoxically executed, according to Lemma 1, we must set d a j = 0, ∀j ∈ J. With this last conditions added, in the same way, we can clean up the mathematical formulation by replacing (51) and (53) by conditions (72) below, as well as removing constraints (55)-(56). This yields an equivalent MILP formulation without any auxiliary variables, and in particular no more binary variables than the number of block and MIC bids:
B. Welfare maximization with complex MIC orders in PCR
We can now state the welfare optimization problem for PCR-like auctions, extending [8] by modelling the introduction of MIC bids, again without introducing any auxiliary variables for these new minimum income conditions. PCR-like auctions with MIC bids: Maximize (2) over the feasible set PCR-FS defined above.
C. Maximizing the traded volume
In the same way, the following objective function corresponds to maximizing the traded volume under the same market rules: max x,y,u,n i|Pi>0
D. Minimizing opportunity costs of PRB
As in [9] , it suffices to consider the following objective function over UMFS and the additional constraints d a j = 0, ∀j J:
E. Other applications
Finally, let us also note that constraints like (72) also allow to control which block bids could be paradoxically rejected on an individual basis, or could also be used to forbid the paradoxical rejection of bids which are too deeply in-themoney, by specifying a threshold via the values of M j .
V. NUMERICAL EXPERIMENTS
One of the key advantages of the new primal-dual approach is the possibility to take full advantage of parallel computing routines of state-of-the-art solvers like CPLEX. The scalability for such instances should be examined further. Here we simply provide a proof-of-concept of the approach, presenting two numerical experiments on: (a) welfare maximization with MIC bids and (b) traded volume maximisation under CWE rules (i.e. without MIC bids). We used AIMMS 4.0 (64 bits) with CPLEX 12.6 on a i7 CPU with 4 cores @ 2.20 Ghz, with 8 GB of RAM, running Windows 7 64 bits.
A. Welfare maximization with MIC bids
Hereafter, we use instances of a two nodes network, with real data from Belgium and the Netherlands from 2011. Tables below present results for ten randomly chosen instances. For these first tests, we took the data from Belgium and the Netherlands (2011) and transformed all sell block bids to MIC bids, specifying different levels of fixed and variable costs (the remaining buy block bids being considered as hourly bids without the MIC condition). We set the variable cost very close to the bid limit prices (as in an example given in [10] ). Concerning the fixed costs, fixing them at a too high level seems to render the problem easier. We therefore opted to present results for an intermediate level of fixed costs yielding a reasonable ratio of accepted and rejected bids, and level of computational complexity. Let us note that all MIC bids are associated to hourly bid curves with one step only, as they have been created from block bids. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first exact method proposed to solve this kind of instances. A time limit of 1200 seconds has been set. The computational results are very encouraging, see 
B. Traded volume maximization
To optimize the traded volume, welfare maximization itself turns out to be a useful heuristic. We first solve this welfare maximization problem, and for the given optimal block bid selection, maximize the traded volume (dealing with a possible indeterminacy of the traded volume for that solution). We then set up a so-called 'cut-off' to only search for better solutions, when running the traded volume maximization problem itself. This helps in practice, either to find better traded volume solutions that one could exist among welfare maximizing solutions, or at least to greatly improve the upper bound. In case an optimal traded volume solution is found, we check that no other welfare maximizing solution (i.e. with another block bid selection) could have the same traded volume. For example, instances # 2 or # 8 show concretes examples where it is possible to obtain more traded volume than when just optimizing welfare (as in the toy example presented above). In the remaining cases, we see that either both solutions coincide (instance # 4), or we can at least greatly improve the upper bound on the maximum traded volume possible. An important point to note is that the approach allows to provide at least such an upper bound, most of the time relatively close to the best available feasible solution.
C. Minimizing opportunity costs
We could proceed as above, (a) first solving the welfare maximizing solution, (b) looking for the minimum opportunity costs possible for this solution, and (c) use this value as a cutoff for the proper opportunity costs minimization problem. Let us note that prices and opportunity costs obtained from stage (b) can substantially differ from the prices computed in practice, as these prices are determined in a different way from what is specified by tie breaking rules in case of price/volume indeterminacy. We refer to [9] for a table showing results for a few CWE instances of 2011.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
The new primal-dual approach proposed here allows to derive powerful algorithmic tools as well as enables to deal with economic issues of interest for day-ahead auctions stakeholders. We have been able to give a MILP formulation of the market clearing problem in the presence of MIC bids, avoiding the introduction of any auxiliary variables, relying on an exact linearisation of the minimum income condition. Partial numerical experiments show first very good results, though tests on larger-scale instances should be carried out. Let us note that a key point of the new approach is the possibility to use massively parallel computing routines of state-of-theart solvers such as CPLEX. From the economic analysis point of view, the approach allowed us to examine the trade-off occurring in practice between different objectives such as welfare maximization and traded volume maximization. The tradeoff for the examined instances were very small, though they could be more important as there are relatively more nonconvex bids. 
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A. Proof of Theorem 1
Proof: We emphasize again, and use below, the fact that according to Lemma 2, we can assume without loss of generality du It remains to verify that all the remaining constraints defining UMFS are satisfied as well. All these additional values trivially satisfy constraints (53)-(56). Therefore, it is needed to show that conditions (51)-(56) are also satisfied for all j ∈ J, c ∈ C. Due to (25), in condition (18), s jr = 0 and we can set d r jr := P jr λ jr − P jr π without altering the satisfaction of any condition. Due to the price range condition and the choice of the parameters M j , these d r j , j ∈ J r satisfy conditions (53), therefore satisfied for all j ∈ J. In condition (19), s ja , d a ja can be redefined without modifying the values of s ja − da ja and hence without altering satisfaction of any other constraint. Due to the large values of the parameters M j , this again can be done so as to satisfy conditions (55) for j ∈ J a , hence for all j ∈ J. Then, (18)-(19), and the 'dispatcher conditions' (53)-(55) imply (51). Finally, concerning the analogue constraints related to the MIC bids, and first using Lemma 1 to set du a ca = 0 for all c a ∈ Ca, it is straightforward to show in a similar way that (20)- (21) together with the additional null values given above allow to satisfy (52), (54).
